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1. INTRODUCTION
Skin of frog, venom of spider and saliva of leech.
Ingredients for the witch's brew at the beginning of
Macbeth? No, they are potentially sources of drugs.
The pharmaceutical industry is going back to nature
... for plants, insects and beasts that might provide
chemicals to fight cancer, AIDS and other diseases.
Such chemical prospecting could also provide an
economic incentive for preserving rain forests and
endangered species .. .
The preservation of tropical forests such as the Amazon has
been identified as one of the crucial environmental challenges
of our age because more species of animals and plants are
found in the Amazon than anywhere else on Earth.' This
growing concern has led environmental organizations to seek
means of curbing the unsound exploitation of natural resources
by less developed countries ("LDCs"). While the emerging
interest of the pharmaceutical industry for the riches of the
rain forest may one day provide the necessary economic
incentive to protect the Amazon and other forests, it is
becoming apparent that a more immediate form of intervention
must be identified. According to some estimates, if deforesta-
tion continues at present rates, the majority of this pristine
habitat will be obliterated in the near future.' Recognizing
that there is a link between the catastrophic environmental
"J.D. 1993, University of Pennsylvania; M.B.A. 1986, Golden Gate
University; B.A. 1983, UniversitA degli Studi di Trieste (Italy).
In memory of my grandmother, Lucia Levi Minzi, whose example
continues to inspire me.
1 Andrew Pollack, Drug Industry Going Back to Nature, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
5, 1992, at Di.
2 See Michael S. Giaimo, Comment, Deforestation in Brazil: Domestic
Political Imperative-Global Ecological Disaster, 18 ENVTL. L. 537 (1988).
' It has been estimated that deforestation is occurring at a rate
of 100,000 square kilometers per year which is equivalent to a net
loss of two percent of all forests each year. See Ecologists Make
Friends with Economists, ECONOMIST, Oct. 15, 1988, at 25.
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exploitation of the LDCs' natural resources and the economic
pressures under which these countries labor, environmental
organizations have attempted to propose solutions that take in
consideration the core economic problems that aggravate
environmental degradation. Many LDCs are saddled with
crushing debt burdens that are serviced at the expense of the
environment.4 Under the combined pressure of repaying the
debt and addressing critical social issues, maay countries
engage in the short-term exploitation of their natural resourc-
es. In an effort to counter these economic pressures, non-
governmental organizations ("NGOs") dedicated to the
protection of the environment have embraced the idea of debt-
for-nature swaps.'
In its purest form, a debt-for-nature swap involves the
acquisition of LDCs' debt by an NGO and its redemption in
local currency to be used for conservation purposes.' Debt-for-
nature exchanges have developed by analogy to debt-for-equity
swaps' and are saluted by politicians, commentators and
environmentalists as ingenious techniques holding the promise
of curing what was thought to be an intractable problem.
Scholars and activists were mesmerized by the potential of
debt-for-nature swaps; in buying distressed debt on the U.S.
market and, then, selling it at face value to a LDC, one could
leverage the financing of conservation programs. For instance,
debt bought at twenty cents on the dollar could be used to
finance the equivalent of one full dollar in conservation
4 See THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, SWAPPING DEBT FOR NATURE (n.d.) (on
file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Business
Law).
' See Statement of John E. Sawhill, President and Chief Executive
Officer of The Nature Conservancy, Before the Subcomm. on Foreign
Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs of the House
Comm. on Appropriations (Mar. 4, 1991) (on file with the University of
Pennsylvania Journal of International Business Law).
S As I shall discuss infra section 4, many different transactions
that would not fit within the parameters of this definition but that
involve both debt and conservation are at times loosely described
as debt-for-nature swaps.
In a debt-for-equity swap, an investor buys a portion of a debtor
country's debt and exchanges the debt for an equity interest in a
local firm or another local asset, instead of collecting the hard
currency originally borrowed. See Robert M. Sadler, Comment, Debt-
for-Nature Swaps: Assessing the Future, 6 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y
319, 326-34 (1990).
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projects. In the roaring '80s, the mystique of financial engi-
neering was very influential and people were prepared to
believe that the mere shuffling around of paper could somehow
create value. Unfortunately, as discussed in Section 2 of this
Article, the leverage of conservation dollars that can be
achieved through debt-for-nature swaps is at least in part a
myth. In order to shed light on this crucial point and to
provide a context for the subsequent discussion of debt-for-
nature swaps, Section 2 briefly recounts the history of the debt
crisis and surveys the techniques that have been developed in
efforts to address the problem.
Section 3 describes some of the most representative debt-
for-nature programs which have been executed since 1987.
Section 3 shows that after a favorable initial reception, LDCs
and NGOs became increasingly aware of the inherent problems
buried in the structure of debt-for-nature swaps. Concerns
about infringements of the LDCs' sovereignty,' fears of
repudiation and preoccupation with the economic impact of the
transactions dictated the subsequent evolution of debt-for-
nature swaps."
Finally, based on the disappointing results of these
programs, this Article in Section 4 argues that it is question-
able whether the goals of conservation are well served by debt-
for-nature swaps. Although these programs benefit banks both
financially and in terms of improved public image, this Article
argues that debt-for-nature swaps are probably not the most
cost-effective mechanism to fund conservation projects. This
Article favors severing the tie between environmental protec-
tion and the debt crisis because debt-for-nature swaps do not
yield economic results of satisfactory magnitude, and it is
likely that linking the two crises could backfire.
In the final analysis, debt-for-nature swaps should be
compared to programs that fund conservation via a straightfor-
ward transfer of moneys from the developed countries to the
' Priya Alagiri, Note, Give Us Sovereignty or Give Us Debt: Debtor
Countries' Perspective on Debt-for-Nature Swaps, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 485
(1992).
' Nina M. Dillon, Comment, The Feasibility of Debt-for-Nature Swaps,
16 N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 127 (1991); see generally Tamara J.
Hrynik, Note, Debt-for-Nature Swaps: Effective but not Enforceable, 22
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 141 (1990).
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LDCs. To the extent that debt-for-nature swaps are fraught
with problems that could delay the creation of cooperative
regimes of conservation between the North and the South,0
this Article calls for NGOs to critically reexamine their
decision to follow the pied piper of financial engineering.
2. EARLY ATTEMPTS TO DEAL WITH THE LDC DEBT CRISIS
2.1. History of the Debt Crisis
The genesis of the LDC debt crisis can be traced back to
the first oil shock of 1973," when the Organization of Petro-
leum Exporting Countries ("OPEC") raised oil prices by
400%.2 Flushed with liquidity, OPEC deposited $200 billion
into the world banking system.' These large deposits, later
labelled "petrodollars," posed a dilemma to money center
banks. With the industrialized world mired in a deep reces-
sion, there was little or no demand for capital. The banks
were unable to recycle the petrodollars domestically by lending
to their traditional corporate customers, 4 and needed a new
outlet for the petrodollars.
Lending to LDCs seemed a very promising proposition to
money center banks for several reasons. First, because of
their assumption that countries, such as Mexico, Argentina
and Brazil, will not go bankrupt," bankers held the belief
that sovereign lending was risk-free. These countries ap-
1 As used herein, the term North refers generally to countries
whose economies are industrially and technologically advanced.
Most of the countries that comprise the North are located in
Europe, North America and Japan. The terms South and LDCs refer
to all other countries.
" See generally Marilyn Post, Comment, The Debt-for-Nature Swap:
A Long-Term Investment for the Economic Stability of Less Developed
Countries, 24 INT'L LAW. 1071 (1990).
" Hans H. Afigermueller, Introduction to SOVEREIGN LENDING:
MANAGING LEGAL RISK vii, vii-viii (Michael Grosen & Ralph Reisner
eds., 1984).
14Louis G. Schirano, A Banker's View, in A DANCE ALONG THE
PRECIPICE: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF THE INTERNATION-
AL DEBT PROBLEM 17, 19 (William N. Eskeridge, Jr. ed., 1985).
Alberto G. Santos, Note, Beyond Baker and Brady: Deeper Debt
Reductions for Latin American Sovereign Debtors, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 66, 74
n.58 (1991).
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peared to have substantial industrial bases and healthy rates
of economic growth.' Moreover, the creditworthiness of
LDCs was bolstered by the rising world prices for the natural
resources exported by these countries 7 . Because of the
unwarranted assumption that lending to LDCs was risk-free,
loans were not granted for specific projects or industries.'"
These "no-strings attached" loans ended up being invested in
state-owned industries that were often inefficiently run.'
Second, bankers were encouraged to lend to LDCs because
of the profitability of these loans. Although the loans were
originally priced at a modest margin over the banks' cost of
funds (the London Interbank Offered Rate), the upfront
syndication fees deducted from the principal were a tantalizing
incentive. 0 Competition for loans to LDCs heated up be-
cause banks were permitted to take these fees in income
during the year of the closing. The resulting feeding frenzy
produced terms and conditions that were grounded in increas-
ingly aggressive projections of future growth and in loose
credit agreements.
From the point of view of LDC governments, these loans
held the promise of fueling economic growth at a faster pace
and at a low cost. In hindsight, the glaring miscalculation
made by both lenders and borrowers is hard to explain. It
bears emphasis, however, that when the loans were initially
incurred, two key economic indicators conspired to mislead the
LDC governments. First, at the time the loans were initiated,
high rates of inflation largely offset the rates on the loans, and
in real terms, the loans appeared very inexpensive.2 ' Second,
a weak dollar misled the LDCs.22 The debt was to be repaid
1" See Nancy A. Aliquo, Comment, Treasury Secretary James Baker's
'Program for Sustained Growth" for the International Debt Crisis: Three
Steps toward Global Financial Security, 4 DICK. J. INT'L L. 275, 277-78
(1986).
17 Santos, supra note 15, at 72.
13 TIM CONGDON, THE DEBT THREAT 113-14 (1988).
"9 PEDRO P. KUCZYNSKI, LATIN AMERICA DEBT 52 (1988).
21 Id at 40.
" According to one study, the real rate of interest was negative
in 1976 and 1977 and did not surpass one percent until 1981. ALFRED
J. WATKINS, TILL DEBT Do Us PART: WHO WINS, WHO LOOSES, AND WHO
PAYS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS 51 (1986).
22 Id.
1993]
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in U.S. currency, and the assumptions made at the time with
regard to future exchange rates turned out to be widely off the
mark.
In 1979, when the second oil shock hit, the banks recycled
another $200 billion from OPEC to the LDCs.2" In 1981,
however, the United States reverted to a restrictive monetary
policy which produced a doubling of interest rates and
appreciation of the dollar.2' The increase in the exchange
and currency rates hit the LDCs with the force of a one-two
punch. Larger interest payments were required because the
loans were priced on the London Interbank Offered Rate which
varies with the level of dollar interest rates generally.25
Moreover, the value of these payments expressed in the LDCs'
currencies had augmented because of the appreciation of the
dollar."6
Additionally, two developments conspired to weaken the
LDCs' ability to manage their financial destiny. First, because
of the recession in the industrialized world, the price of the
commodities which represented a large share of the LDCs'
exports took a plunge. Second, the rise in the rates of interest
available in the United States accelerated the flight of capital
from the LDCs.2
By 1982 the debt crisis had matured into a tragedy that
finally caught the attention of the public opinion when the
Mexican Minister of Finance informed the banks that his
"country can't pay anymore."28 Although the magnitude of
the problem called for a concerted response to the crisis, the
industrialized nations chose to ignore it until 1985.29 In the
interim, money center'banks were left to their own devices. In
a futile effort to protect their reported profitability, banks
28 Angermueller, supra note 12, at viii.
24 I& at ix.
25 CONGDON, supra note 18, at 113.
2l
'7 See WATKINS, supra note 21, at 29.
2 Schirano, supra note 14, at 20 (quoting Finance Minister Jesus
Silva Herzog).
29 Between 1982 and 1985, then U.S. Secretary of the Treasury
Donald Regan dismissed inquiries about the debt crisis with the
following stock response: "This is not a debt crisis, it is a liquidity
problem. People go bankrupt, not nations." See James Srodes,
Banana Bonds, the Movie, FINANCIAL WORLD, June 13, 1989, at 24.
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extended new loans so that the LDCs could meet the interest
payments when due."0 This policy of "gap financing" was
aimed at preserving the fiction that the loans were still viable.
However, no new money was provided to the LDCs, 1 and as
a result, the economies of these countries stagnated and their
ability to meet their obligations deteriorated.
Recognizing that gap financing was a failure, then U.S.
Treasury Secretary James Baker proposed a "Program for
Sustained Growth" (the "Baker Plan"). 2 The plan provided
some new funds to the LDCs and was designed to encourage
private sector initiatives to address the crisis. During the
subsequent three years, from 1985 to 1988, the amount of
interest paid by the LDCs exceeded the infusion of fresh
money provided by the Baker Plan, and led most commenta-
tors to conclude that the plan failed.3" As time passed, both
the banks and the LDCs became willing to experiment with
different techniques to reduce the debt. Debt buy-backs 4
and debt-for-equity 5 were the first financial mechanisms
that were used to alleviate the crisis. At the time, both
techniques were hailed as clever market-oriented responses to
a crisis that had previously seemed unmanageable. It soon
became apparent, however, that these techniques were having
only a marginal impact on the total debt burden. Between
1982 and 1989, these strategies reduced the LDCs debt by
31 U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEVELOPMENT, TRADE AND DEVELOP-
MENT REPORT, 1988, at 96, U.N. Doc. No. UNCTAD/TDR/8, U.N. Sales No.
E.88.II.D.8 (1988).
31 CONGDON, supra note 18, at 150; see Third World Debt Problem:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Debt of the Senate Comm. on
Finance, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 66-67 (1987) (statement of James
Hurlock, Partner, White & Case).
31 See generally CONGDON, supra note 18.
33 Santos, supra note 15, at 77.
,' From 1982 to 1989, debt buy-backs by private companies resulted
in an estimated eight billion dollar reduction of the total debt. In
1988, debtor governments also bought back loans. For example,
Bolivia purchased $240 million of its own debt at 11% of its face
value and Chile purchased $300 million at 56% of the original value.
J.P. Morgan & Co., LDC Debt Reduction: A Critical Appraisal, WORLD FIN.
MARKETS., Dec. 30, 1988, at 6.
5 See discussion infra section 2.2 on the debt-exchange approach;
see also J.P. Morgan & Co., supra note 34, at 7 (Debt-for-equity swaps
were entered into by Chile ($2.35 billion), Mexico ($2.4 billion) and
Brazil ($5.89 billion).).
1993]
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$38.9 billion, a trivial amount given that the estimated total
of the LDC debt is now well over $500 billion."6
In 1989, while the debt crisis continued to grow, Nicholas
Brady, who succeeded Baker as Secretary of the Treasury,
proposed a new program (the "Brady Initiative") which
recognized for the first time the harsh reality that most of the
LDC debt is truly uncollectible. 7 ' The Brady Initiative tried
to encourage write-offs of the loans by providing guarantees on
the remaining portions of the loans.
While it may still be too early to pass judgment on the
Brady Initiative, commentators have remarked that so far the
program has not impacted the net capital outflow that is
holding back the development of LDCs.3" More importantly,
the Brady Initiative did not diminish the incentives to engage
in practices that cause damage to the environment.
2.2. The Debt-Exchange Approach
The legal and financial structure of debt-for-nature swaps
mirrors the model created by debt-for-equity exchanges. Thus,
understanding how the latter functions sheds light on the
issues embedded in the former.
The first voluntary exchange of debt for equity or some
other form of consideration took place in 1985." The raison
d'etre of such exchanges is that while a debtor country may be
unable to repay its loans on time and in the original currency
of the transaction, it may be willing to swap the debt for
something else that the bank, in turn, can resell to a third
party.4 These transactions were made possible by the
development of a secondary market for the trading of sovereign
debt.4 ' This market values LDCs' debt at prices that are
36 Santos, supra note 15, at 78.
37 ICL
s See Santos, supra note 15, at 80.
3 3Debt Swap Plan is Proposed by Mexicans, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 1985,
at 29.
4 The economic and legal analysis of the debt-exchange approach
summarized in this section of the article was first developed in the
seminal article by Michael Chamberlin et al. See Michael Chamber-
lin et al., Sovereign Debt Exchanges, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 415.
41 On the secondary market, traders sell LDC loans at discounted
prices that reflect the estimated collectability of the obligation.
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substantially below the principal amount of the debt.
The cornerstone of a debt-exchange program is the willing-
ness of the debtor country to exchange the debt purchased on
the secondary market for local currency to be deployed in an
approved investment. For instance, a loan having a face value
of one million dollars could be purchased on the secondary
market for $200,000. It might then be swapped in Brazilian
cruzeiros worth one million dollars with the proviso that the
cruzeiros must be invested in a specific project for a prescribed
number of years.'
The exchange appears to benefit all the parties involved.
Banks clearly gain in three ways. First, they reduce their
foreign debt exposure on terms that are substantially more
favorable than those that would have been available in the
secondary markets. Second, they earn a merchant banking fee
for arranging the transaction. Third, the banks' traders earn
the broker's spread on the sale of the debt. The party interest-
ed in making an equity investment in the LDC appears to gain
because it managed to purchase cruzeiros at a discount,
thereby- decreasing the cost of the investment and increasing
the return that will be earned on the project. Finally, the LDC
seems to gain because it attracted a project that will generate
jobs and hard currency, and it reduced its debt load. This rosy
picture of the transaction has led some commentators to argue
that:
the existing debt has become the new currency of asset
deployment and investment throughout Latin America
and elsewhere. Debtors, commercial banks, and other
investors are now using cheaply obtained debt from
secondary loan markets as a discounted currency
substitute for use in a variety of complex and innova-
tive merchant banking transactions. Although the
country debt problem continues, there are signs of
vigorous life after restructuring throughout Latin
Thus, depending on the economic position of the obligor, loans have
traded at discounts of as much as 95% of their original value. See
Richard Evans, Secondary Markets: Anomalous But Profitable,
EUROMONEY, Jan. 1988, at 25 (Supp. Jan. 1988).
"' Chamberlin et al., supra note 40, at 418.
1993]
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America.'
To the extent that the logic of debt-exchanges constitutes
the underpinning of debt-for-nature transactions, it is impor-
tant to critically question the assumptions underlying the
argument in favor of debt-for-equity swaps. The starting point
of my analysis is a two-pronged query. First, a pragmatic
observation: if debt-exchanges are indeed the panacea that
they are reputed to be, why have so relatively few transactions
been consummated? Are there hidden legal and political costs
that have offset the advantages of these exchanges? Second,
setting aside the form of the transactions, and focusing on
their substance: shouldn't one expect that, over time, competi-
tion in the financial markets will reduce and eventually
eliminate the arbitrage opportunity that debt-exchanges seem
to be exploiting?
With respect to the first issue, it is well established that
debt-for-equity swaps had a very limited impact on the debt
crisis." LDCs have resisted these transactions out of fear
that debt-for-equity programs would subsidize investments
that would have taken place even in the absence of this
incentive." Thus, from the LDCs' perspective, the subsidy
might turn out to be a dead-weight loss.4" Alternatively, the
LDCs expressed concerns that the programs would encourage
investments that may not be viable.' The LDCs, in pursuing
debt-for-equity swaps, would be throwing good money after bad
money. The consequence of these rational preoccupations is
that the LDCs have structured their regulation of debt-
exchanges with a view to exercise control over the investments
that they will authorize."'
43 Id. at 419.
44 Santos, supra note 15, at 78.
"' Energizing Third World Economies: The Role of Debt-Equity Swaps,
Heritage Foundation Reports, Nov. 9, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Omni File.
4' There is substantial controversy as to whether debt-equity
swaps lack "additionality," i.e., whether they result in investments
that would not be made in their absence. The International Finance
Corporation, an arm of the World Bank, has found in a study that
the swap mechanism induced additional investments only in 50% of
the cases. Id.
4 See Chamberlin et al., supra note 40, at 426.
4Id. at 425.
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The principal goal of these regulations appears to be that
of "splitting the discount." In other words, LDCs sought to
extract part of the value realized by the investors who
purchased the debt at a discounted price in the secondary
market. This result was often achieved by imposing a sliding
scale on the rate of exchange at which the U.S. denominated
debt was converted into the foreign currency 0 The Mexican
program, for instance, provides that the foreign exchange rate
to be applied will be either the free market rate for high
priority investments, or the free market rate minus 40% for
the lowest priority investments.51 It does not take a great
leap of imagination to realize that high priority investments
are likely to be investments that yield lower rate of returns to
the investors. So that even in the case of high priority invest-
ments, the discount is split by compelling investments that
have a reduced earning potential. In sum, the regulations
enacted in most countries have created a framework that
effectively curtails any arbitrage profit.
Another economic factor which offsets the ostensibly
profitable profile of a debt-for-equity swap is inflation.
Investors who purchase large amounts of local currency in one
transaction may be paying more than what they really need to
pay. Because inflation in some LDCs has been very high,
periodic purchases of local currency to meet the cash flow
needs of the project are likely to yield a lower average rate of
exchange than the discounted rate obtained through the swap.
Incidentally, it should be noted that a by-product of a massive
debt-for-equity program could be an increase in the rate of
inflation because the LDC would have to print large amounts
of currency to retire the debt.52
At its core, the debt-for-equity mechanism presupposes that
one can, over a protracted period of time, buy debt at a low
price in one market and sell it at a high price in another
market. If this money machine truly existed, arbitragers
would actively engage in trading until the two markets were
4,'IL
"Id at 426.
5 1 d. Most Latin American countries, including Brazil, Argentina,
Chile, Venezuela and Ecuador, have adopted similar mechanisms.
5 See Lee C. Buchkeit, Alternative Techniques in Sovereign Debt
Restructuring, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 371, 398.
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brought into equilibrium. The fact that such trading is not
occurring strongly suggests that other factors work their way
into the process and render debt-for-equity transactions a
much less attractive proposition than it was originally
proclaimed to be.
A debt-exchange is essentially a foreign currency transac-
tion that is initiated with the expectation that the mechanism
will lower the cost of purchasing local currency for a specific
purpose. The lackluster performance of debt-exchanges
supports the hypothesis that the following factors often offset
the lower cost of the local currency:
(i) LDCs' regulations that either limit the investments
to lower yielding projects or mandate an arbitrary
currency exchange rate that captures part of the
discount;
(ii) the effect of high rates of inflation on the purchas-
ing power of the local currency; and
(iii) high transaction costs incurred in order to obtain
debtor and creditor country approval and to comply
with the provision of the original loan agreement.
The poor results of debt-for-equity programs are consistent
with the notion that a rational LDC government does not want
to lose the opportunity to attract new money to its economy.
Thus, only those projects which would not occur in the absence
of a subsidy should be eligible for a debt-for-equity swap.
3. EVOLUTION OF DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS PROGRAMS
3.1. Genesis of Debt-for-Nature Swaps
A 1984 op-ed piece in the New York Times first discussed
the correlation between environmental degradation and the
debt crisis.5" Dr. Thomas Lovejoy of the World Wildlife Fund
(the "WWF") argued in the article that the financial crisis in
developing nations had resulted in catastrophic reductions in
the already meager environmental budgets of these countries.
Moreover, because of their economic situation, the LDCs
channeled most of the foreign developmental aid that they
" Thomas E. Lovejoy III, Aid Debtors Nations' Ecology, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 4, 1984, at A31.
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received into businesses that generated hard currency rather
than funding environmental projects. Given these dismal
developments, Dr. Lovejoy proposed that the twin problems of
debt and the environment be addressed simultaneously with
a bold strategy of swapping debt for nature."'
The article stimulated the debate concerning the link
between conservation and the debt crisis. In response to the
growing debate, the World Bank established a new department
charged with the responsibility of integrating environmental
concerns into the bank's overall lending policies.5" Even
though a transaction had not yet been consummated, there
was great interest and enthusiasm for an idea that presented
considerable appeal both intellectually and emotionally. The
notion that one crisis could be used to solve the other seemed
very satisfying intellectually. From the point of view of
environmental activists, debt-for-nature seemed to promise the
much needed funding for the myriad of projects that have
become increasingly urgent. Enthusiasm aside, as of 1986,
there was no clear understanding of how such a transaction
would work or whether it would be feasible.
3.2. Examples of Implemented Debt-for-Nature Swaps
3.2.1. Bolivia: The First Swap
In 1987, Conservation International ("CI"), a Washington
based NGO, launched the first debt-for-nature swap."' With
the assistance of Citicorp, CI purchased approximately
$650,000 worth of Bolivian debt for $100,000 in the secondary
loan market. Subsequently, CI agreed to cancel the debt in
exchange for a package of measures which established a
biosphere reserve in the foothills of the Bolivian Andes. The
Bolivian government agreed to (1) raise the legal status, from
protection by decree to protection by legislative enactment, of
the 334,200-acre Beni Biosphere Reserve, the adjoining
877,205-acre Yacuma Regional Park and Cordebeni Water
Basin and an additional 2,870,561-acre Chimane Forest
64 Id.
See Chamberlin et al., supra note 40, at 440.
,Phillip Shabecoff, Bolivia to Protect Lands in Swap for Lower Debt,
N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1987, at C2.
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Reserve (a buffer zone for sustained development) and (2)
establish an operational fund for the management and
protection of the Beni Biosphere in the local currency equiva-
lent of $250,000."7
Under the terms of the agreement, CI committed to
providing ongoing technical, financial, and managerial
assistance in connection with the biosphere. However, CI did
not receive title to the land or any form of specific right to the
project itself. In fact, the Beni Biosphere was to be adminis-
tered by the Bolivian government in conjunction with a
Bolivian NGO.
The subsequent history of the Bolivian experiment high-
lights one of the most serious pitfalls of debt-for-nature swaps.
The agreement between CI and the Bolivian government
permitted commercial logging in the buffer zone subject to
specified reforestation requirements. Unfortunately, the local
commercial logging interests have ignored the reforestation
requirement.5"
3.2.2. Ecuador: The First Debt-for-Debt Swap
The second debt-for-nature swap was spearheaded by the
WWF and involved a number of different conservation projects
in Ecuador.59 The first step in this deal was the purchase by
Citicorp, on behalf of the WWF, of about one million dollars of
Ecuadorian debt for approximately thirty-five cents on the
dollar. Subsequently, the debt was assigned to Fundacion
Natura ("F'N"), an Ecuadorian conservation organization.
Finally, FN exchanged the debt for nine-year bonds issued in
local currency and worth one million dollars. The bonds were
purchased at Ecuador's official rate of exchange and yielded,
at the time, a rate of 31% per annum. Under the agreement,
interest on the bonds was to be used by FN to finance conser-
5 7See Chamberlin et al., supra note 40, at 441.
s See Merrill Collett, Bolivia Blazes Trail ... to Where?, CHRISTIAN
SC. MONITOR, July 10, 1989, at 4.
" See Kathryn S. Fuller & Douglas F. Williamson, Debt-for-Nature
Swaps: A New Means of Funding Conservation in Developing Nations, 11
Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 301, 302 (May 11, 1988); Kathryn S. Fuller,
Debt-for-Nature Swaps, 23 ENVTL. SC. & TECH. 1450, 1451 (1989); see also
Conservation Groups Help Bail Out the Big Banks, Bus. & Socy REV.,
Spring 1988, at 34.
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vation in a number of Ecuadorian National Parks. The
principal, when repaid at maturity, would be used to endow a
fund in support of FN's conservation activities.
The Ecuadorian debt-for-debt swap was saluted as a
significant improvement over the Bolivian transaction because
it addressed some of the emerging concerns of LDCs consider-
ing the possibility of starting debt-for-nature programs. First,
because the debt was exchanged for other debt rather than
cash, it was argued that this transaction did not produce
inflation as a cash transaction would. 0 Second, because the
funding was provided to a local NGO, charges of ecological
imperialism were deflected by an arrangement that enlisted
the local population activists." Furthermore, some thought
that the Ecuadorian pure investment in conservation rather
than in a mix of conservation and sustainable development, as
in the Bolivian case, was preferable.6 2
The Ecuadorian swap was the first installment of a large
program that called for a series of transactions. In 1989, in
fact, the WWF and the Nature Conservancy purchased, for
twelve cents on the dollar, approximately nine million dollars
worth of additional debt." Incidentally, it is important to
note that the market value of Ecuadorian debt lost two thirds
of its value between the first and the second transaction. This
is significant because it suggests that the purchasing power of
the interest generated by the first bonds acquired by the WWF
must have also declined. FN's ability to fund those meritori-
ous projects has also declined due to the loss in value.
" See Conservation Groups Help Bail Out the Big Banks, supra note 59,
at 34.
"l The choice of the projects to be financed with the bonds was
delegated to Ecuadorian state agencies. Debt-for-Nature Agree-
ment dated as of March. 22, 1989 between The Nature Conservancy
and Fundacion Natura (on file with the University of Pennsylvania
Journal of International Business Law).
'2 Id
See Jeff Swimmer, Environmentalists Sign Record Debt Plan to Save
Rain Forest, Reuter Libr. Rep., Apr. 5, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Omni File.
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3.2.3. The Costa Rican Swaps
The first Costa Rican swap took place in 1987 and presents
several unusual characteristics. First, the deal was initiated
by the Costa Rican Minister of Natural ResQurces, and did not
involve any foreign NGO. The National Parks Foundation, a
local NGO, purchased $5.4 million worth of Costa Rican debt
for $918,000. Then, the Central Bank of Costa Rica ex-
changed the $5.4 million debt for local currency bonds valued
at 75% of the original amount."' At the time this transaction
was consummated, Costa Rican debt was trading in the
secondary market at approximately seventeen cents on the
dollar."6 However, in subsequent transactions, the Costa
Rican government issued local currency bonds valued at only
30% of the original amount.6" Moreover, the bonds were
exchanged for original debt that was now trading at sixteen
cents on the dollar in the secondary market.6 8 In sum, the
evolution of the terms exacted by the Costa Rican government
confirms the trend toward "splitting the discount"" that was
already observed in the debt-for-equity context. Not surpris-
ingly, the Costa Ricans have over time sought to extract more
and more of the value that NGOs thought they could realize by
purchasing the debt at a discount.
Costa Rica completed a different type of debt-for-nature
swap. In 1989, the Dutch government bought thirty-three
million dollars of Costa Rican debt for five million dollars, and
signed an agreement with the government establishing a joint
trust fund managed by a commission composed of representa-
64 See Alagiri, supra note 8, at 495.
, Agreement Between [sic] the Central Bank of Costa Rica, the
National Parks Foundation, the Ministry of Industry, Energy and
Mining, and the Costa Rican Cooperative Bank R.L. for the Creation
of a Natural Resources Conservation Fund (dated Oct. 27, 1987 and
translated at The Nature Conservancy, Latin American Division, Jan.
1988) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Internatio-
nal Business Law).
" Alvaro Umana, Costa Rica's Debt-for-Nature Swaps Come of Age,
WALL ST. J., May 26, 1989, at All; see also WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, THE
COSTA RIcAN CASE (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal
of International Business Law).
67 See Chamberlin et al., supra note 40, at 445.
*s See Umana, supra note 66, at All.
*' See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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tives of the two governments.7  Costa Rica's conservation
efforts have been fairly successful7 1 for reasons that, at least
indirectly, confirm some of the problems embedded in debt-for-
nature swaps. First, Costa Rica has taken n active role in
initiating many of the programs that are now in place. As a
result, charges of eco-imperialism have been defused from the
outset. Second, Costa Rica has a stable government and has
been a democracy for almost 100 years.7 2 As a consequence,
NGOs investing in Costa Rica are less concerned about
expropriation risks.
3.2.4. The Malagasy Case
The Malagasy case illustrates yet another variation on the
debt-for-nature theme. The distinguishing feature is that the
transaction was financed by the U.S. government. In 1989,
the government of Madagascar and the United States Agency
for International Development (the "AID") coordinated a swap
to protect the endangered status of the Malagasy tropical
forest."3 The novelty of this transaction is not limited to the
fact that the U.S. taxpayers provided the bulk of the financing.
It is also noteworthy that the AID was not a direct party in
the deal. Instead, the funds were channeled through the NGO.
The one million dollars contributed by the AID was used to
redeem $2.1 million in Malagasy debt. The local currency
proceeds are held in an interest bearing account and are used
for various conservation projects.74
The Malagasy case represents a crucial development by
showing the support of the executive branch for debt-for-
nature swaps. This support has been continued in subsequent
proposals like former President Bush's plan to establish a $100
million facility to be operated by the U.S. Department of
Treasury for the purpose of encouraging debt reduction
70 See Post, supra note 11, at 1071.
71 Mark Crawford, Costa Rica's Campaign for Conservation, SCIENCE,
Mar. 18, 1988, at 1367.
7 2 Id.
71 See Rosanne Model, Comment, Debt-for-Nature Swaps: Environmen-
tal Investments Using Taxpayer Funds Without Adequate Remedies for
Expropriation, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1195, 1206 (1991).
4 Id
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programs (including debt-for-nature swaps) in Latin Ameri-
ca.
75
3.2.5. Other Debt-for-Nature Swaps
Several other debt-for-nature programs should be men-
tioned in order to give a flavor of the scope and characteristics
of these programs.
In 1989, the WWF executed the first debt-for-nature swap
outside of Latin America."' The Philippines case involved the
acquisition of approximately two million dollars in debt, at
fifty-one cents on the dollar, and the transfer of the local
currency equivalent of the principal amount to an account
available to domestic NGOs engaged in conservation pro-
jects. 7  The noteworthy feature of this deal is that the
consideration received for the swap was in the form of
immediately available local currency.
7 s
In 1989, the government of the then Federal Republic of
Germany wrote off approximately $405 million of Kenya's debt
in exchange for Kenya's generic commitment to protect
nature.7 9
In 1991, the Brazilian government announced plans to
create a $100 million debt-for-nature program."0 The pro-
gram, however, has encountered many difficulties. Until 1991,
Brazil resisted all attempts to initiate a debt-for-nature
program out of fear of its inflationary impact."' Moreover,
the Brazilians opposed efforts to restrict their commercial
activities in the rain forest as forms of "environmental
7' Bush Sends Legislative Proposal to Congress to Implement Initiative
for Latin America, 7 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) (Intl Trade Rep. Current
Rep.) 1444 (Sept. 19, 1990).
76 See Chamberlin et al., supra note 40, at 446.
77 WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, THE PHILIPPINES CASE (on file with the
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Business Law).
78 World Wildlife Fund Term Sheet (n.d.) (available from the
World Wildlife Fund).
7" Ramesh Jaura, Finance: West Germany in "Debt-for-Nature" Deal
With Kenya, Inter Press Service, Oct. 4, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Omni File.
80 Brazil to Create $100 million Fund for Environment, UPI, June 25,
1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library; Omni File.
8' Julia Michaels, Brazil Opens Door to Environment Funding, THE
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 12, 1992, at 4.
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imperialism" that imposes a unilateral burden on their
country." After announcing the creation of the program, the
Brazilians have proceeded very slowly. As of this writing, the
only swap that has been sanctioned involves the purchase of
$2.2 million of Brazilian debt in the secondary market.8 " The
debt will be donated to a local NGO which will exchange it for
$2.2 million in long-term Brazilian "Environmental Govern-
ment Bonds" paying interest at the annual rate of six percent.
The funds will be used to help conserve and protect the
200,000 acre Grande Sertao Veredas Park which is located in
a unique region of cerrados, or savannah lands."
The thinly veiled reluctance of the Brazilians to embrace
debt-for-nature programs is not the only obstacle that has
emerged in this program. While the Nature Conservancy
planned to raise $850,000 to purchase the debt, so far it has
only secured $150,000 from American Express. 5 As a result,
the first year of the bond issue was underfunded by $250,000.
As of March 1992, approximately $110 million worth of
debt has been purchased worldwide for about $22 million."
In theory, these programs have generated $71 million for
conservation projects.8 "
3.3. Taxonomy of Initiated Debt-for Nature Swaps
Based on the transactions surveyed, it appears that at least
four forms of swaps have developed:
(a) The Philippine swap is a basic exchange of debt for
immediately available local currency. This form of swap is the
exception rather than the norm because LDCs are concerned
with the inflationary effects of printing currency to retire the
a Hobert Rowen, Heading Off an Amazon Disaster, WASH. POST., Apr.
2, 1989, at Hi.
"kdL
"' First Debt-for-Nature Swap for Brazil Lacks Startup Funds, LDC Debt
Report vol. 5 No. 20, Latin American Markets, May 25, 1992, at 4,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
"The Nature Conservancy, Officially Sanctioned and Funded
Debt-for-Nature Swaps to Date (Mar. 1992) (on file with the
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Business Law).
'"Huntington Williams III, Banking on the Future, NATURE
CONSERVANCY, May/June 1992, at 27.
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debt;
(b) the Bolivian swap is an outright cancellation of debt in
exchange for a governmental commitment to protect the
environment coupled with the allocation of funds for this
purpose;
(c) the Ecuadorian swap is a conversion of a dollar denomi-
nated debt into a local currency bond that throws off interest
dedicated to environmental projects; and
(d) the first Costa Rican swap exemplifies the growing
trend by LDCs to retain most of the discount whereas the
Dutch-Costa Rican transaction is an example of a government
to government exchange.
LDCs and NGOs have continuously experimented with
various forms of debt-for-nature swaps in an effort to alleviate
some of the problems that they perceive in the transactions.
All this tinkering with the structure of the deals indicates the
serious limitations of debt-for-nature swaps.
4. LIMITATIONS OF DEBT-FOR-NATURE SwAPs PROGRAMS
4.1. Debt-for-Nature Swaps are Often Incompatible with the
Economic Realities of LDCs
Efforts to protect environmental treasures such as the rain
forests are generally commendable. But the success of these
efforts depends on the identification of strategies that are
compatible with the fundamental economic interests of the
parties involved. To the extent that developed countries and
NGOs cannot impose their values on LDCs, conditions must be
created that provide economic incentives for LDCs to conserve.
The third principle of the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development adopted by the nations participating in the 1992
environmental summit in Brazil (the 'Declaration") proclaims
that "[the right to development must be fulfilled so as to
equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of
present and future generations.""8 The seventh principle of
the Declaration, however, emphatically stresses that "[t]he
developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they
bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development
88 The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 31 I.L.M.
874 (1992).
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in view of the pressures their societies place on the global
environment and of the technologies and financial resources
they command.""'
Most LDCs' economies depend on natural resources. For
instance, ninety-eight percent of Bolivia's exports are so-called
primary products. 0 Similarly, commercial activities which
contribute to the destruction of the Amazon are an intrinsic
part of the Brazilian economy."1 Therefore, inasmuch as
debt-for-nature programs fund projects that foreclose access to
natural resources and slow down the economic development of
the South, they will face strong opposition.
For this reason, it has been argued that pure debt-for-
nature programs should be rejedted and that debt-for-sustain-
able development should be implemented. 2 In essence, this
approach calls for strategies that provide incentives to
environmentally sound commercial activities and force
currently profitable commercial activities to become more
environmentally sound.9" Thus, for instance, proponents of
debt-for-sustainable development have argued that strategies
which increase agricultural efficiency and promote the efficient
use of energy resources will do more to protect the environ-
ment than the establishment of nature reserves.9"
4.2. Debt-for-Nature Swaps Infringe on the Sovereignty of
LDCs
Supporters of debt-for-nature swaps argue that there is no
sovereignty issue because the transactions do not contemplate
foreign ownership or dominance of LDCs' resources.95 This
argument ignores the concerns that LDCs have openly
expressed about this issue.96 For example, Jose Sarney, the
former President of Brazil, characterized the swaps as
*See David Barrans, Note, Promoting International Environmental
Protection Through Foreign Debt Exchange Transactions, 24 CORNELL INTVL
L.J. 65, 81 (1991).
"1 See id. at 70-71.
' Id. at 83.
93 IcL
14 Id. at 84-85.
" See Hrynik, supra note 9, at 152.
"siald
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unacceptable forms of "colonialism"."' Other commentators
have persuasively argued that NGOs rarely consult with the
local population with respect to the impact of their involve-
ment.98 In the Bolivian transaction, for instance, the new
environmental program changed the way of life of the local
population. The enacted program prohibited many traditional
activities that were inconsistent with conservation goals.9
Some degree of interference is unavoidable, because NGOs
often supervise the use of funds and also act as technical
advisors to the programs. The issue of whether this interfer-
ence amounts to a legally cognizable violation of sovereignty
depends on one's definition of sovereignty. In order to argue
that all forms of swaps violate the sovereignty of the LDCs,
one would have to equate sovereignty with a nation's right to
be free from economic coercion. However, this notion ignores
the prevailing practices in today's world. Threatening to
withdraw economic aid is a form of coercion that is perhaps
morally questionable, but is probably not legally objectionable
because the countries withholding the benefit are not under a
legal obligation to provide assistance.
LDCs governments actively participate and consent to the
swaps. Therefore, arguing that economic coercion by itself is
an infringement of sovereignty is unpersuasive. Nevertheless,
the issue of sovereignty has had an impact on the development
of the structure of swaps. Due to sovereignty concerns, LDCs
prefer swaps that involve local NGOs rather than foreign
NGOs, and they oppose the inclusion of enforcement provisions
and stabilization clauses in the swaps agreements."°
4.3. Debt-for-Nature Swaps Agreements are not Enforceable
Sovereignty concerns foreclose the inclusion in the swap
agreement of provisions protecting the NGOs against the
'7 Hobert Rowen, supra note 82, at H10.
88 See Alagiri, supra note 8, at 499.
"See, e.g., Eve Burton, Debt for Development: A New Opportunity for
Nonprofits, Commercial Banks and Developing States, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J.
233, 241 (1990) (stating that the local tribes depend on the forest
for fuel and food).
...See Christopher T. Curtis, The Legal Security of Economic
Development Agreements, 29 HARV. INT'L L.J. 317, 359-360 (1988); see also
Debt for Nature: The Second Year, SWAPS, Nov. 1988, at 9.
[Vol. 14:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol14/iss1/2
DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS
threat of repudiation or expropriation. For example, the
Bolivian agreement does not include an arbitration, choice of
law, or choice of forum clause in any of its provisions."'1
Therefore, if the Bolivian government repudiates the agree-
ment with CI,0 CI could not compel performance. Further-
more, under U.S. law, foreign sovereign immunity protects
Bolivia in any suit in a U.S. court."'° To make matters
worse, CI would not have standing to bring an action before
the International Court of Justice because CI is not a
state."04
4.4. Debt-for-Nature Swaps do not Promote the Creation of
Regimes of Cooperation
A 1991 report to the U.S. Congress prepared by the
General Accounting Office concluded that "[slo-called debt for
environmental development or nature swaps, while generating
a good deal of publicity, did not actually accomplish much
.... ,o The General Accounting Office expressed the belief
that the list of disadvantages for debtor countries is lengthy
and includes: the potential inflationary impact of debt swaps,
the relatively high price that is often paid for the debt, the
implicit subsidy provided to private voluntary organizations,
the perceived loss of sovereignty, and the potential for debt
swaps to restrict remunerative development projects."
All of these disadvantages can be attenuated by modifying
the structure of the swap. For instance, inflationary concerns
can be addressed by an exchange of foreign currency debt for
local currency debt." Such an exchange does not complete-
ly eliminate the inflationary impact of the swap but it does
stretch the negative side-effects over a longer period of time.
Similarly, the concerns about the high price that could be paid
See Alagiri, supra note 8, at 495.
102 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
103 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988).
14See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26,
1945, art. 34(1), 59 Stat. 1055, 1059.
' Debt-for-Nature Swaps Fizzle, Says GAO, Institutional Investor
Inc. Bank Letter, Dec. 23, 1991, vol. XV, No. 51, at 6, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
1
7 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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for the debt and the implicit subsidy piovided to private
voluntary organizations can be alleviated by "splitting the
discount. " "'c In the end, however, the government of the
LDCs via regulations that impose fees or mandate an arbitrary
currency exchange rate have often eliminated most, if not all,
of the leverage that justified the transaction costs of the
swaps. Over time, the LDCs governments realized that
"splitting the discount" is not enough."' Whenever an LDC
government paid more than the secondary market price to
repurchase its own debt, it was simply conferring a disguised
subsidy to the project.
Proponents of the swaps mistakenly believed that these
transactions were generous forms of assistance provided by the
North to the South. In reality, the economic substance of the
swaps appears to benefit the North more than the South.
Based on this newly acquired perspective on the problem,
LDCs, NGOs and developed countries need to reassess the
validity of these swaps by measuring their impact against the
objective of developing regimes of cooperation in the conserva-
tion area between the North and the South.
4.5. Direct Financing as an Alternative
While debt-for-nature swaps have played some role in
promoting micro-conservation efforts, I suspect that any effort
to address the macro-economic dimensions of the environmen-
tal crisis will require direct financing.
In order to protect the global commons, LDCs and devel-
oped countries need to develop responses to situations in which
the pursuit of "interests defined in purely individualistic terms
regularly leads to socially undesirable outcomes."" 0  Debt-
for-nature swaps do not promote cooperation because they may
be both inefficient and unfair. By contrast, straightforward
financing of conservation by the North for the benefit of the
South seems a more promising alternative. Promoting
conservation and restricting environmentally destructive
activities in the South will ultimately necessitate the transfer
1og See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
log See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
n1 ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: BUILDING REGIMES
FOR NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT 84 (1989).
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of vast resources from the North. A transfer of the required
magnitude cannot be accomplished through a debt-for-nature
swap without causing inflation and political backlash in the
LDCs. If, at some point in the future, the developed countries
finally realize that their survival may well depend on investing
large sums in the sustainable development of the South, they
will not invest via a swap because the transaction costs
involved would be staggering. In addition, the inflationary
effect would be unacceptable to the people in the LDCs.
Undoubtedly, direct financing of conservation projects will
encounter some of the same difficulties which have emerged in
the context of the debt-for-nature swaps. Sovereignty ques-
tions and problems of economic dislocation clearly remain
difficult issues that probably need to be addressed on an ad
hoc basis. On the other hand, direct financing will reduce
transaction costs and will eliminate the risk that the political
recriminations connected with the debt crisis will hamper the
prospects of promoting conservation efforts. One example of
this trend toward direct financing of conservation projects is
offered by the Mbaracayu project in Paraguay. After attempt-
ing to negotiate a swap for over two years the Nature Conserv-
ancy ended up buying a tract of tropical forest from the
International Finance Corporation, which had acquired title to
the land after the bankruptcy of a Paraguayan firm."'
In essence, the problem of promoting conservation in the
South is grounded in a market failure. The long-term value of
the trees to humanity is not impounded in their market price.
Therefore, LDCs do not have sufficient incentives to engage in
sustainable development practices. Debt-for-nature swaps do
not contribute to the solution because they raise the additional
problems that have been discussed. From the perspective of
world welfare, direct financing makes more economic sense.
Developed countries must step in and pay a price for the trees
that reflects their long-term value.
To the extent that issues of sovereignty and economic
dislocation will remain problematic even under a regime of
direct financing, the lesson to be learned from the debt-for-
nature experiment is that conservation must be promoted
.. LDC Debt Report No. 20, Latin American Markets, June 3, 1991,
at 9, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
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through local intermediaries, such as in the Costa Rican
swaps, in a manner that is compatible with economic growth.
Regimes of cooperation often develop as product of trial and
error processes.' Recognizing that debt-for-nature swaps
have been relatively unsuccessful in fostering cooperative
regimes of conservation is perhaps the first step in one of such
processes. It is a step in the direction of acknowledging that
financial wizardry is not a substitute for the inevitable
redistribution of wealth that the conservation of the rain forest
will ultimately require.
5. CONCLUSION
Debt-for-nature programs have promoted a number of
valuable conservation projects. However, the magnitude of the
environmental crisis will require political commitments and
economic resources that are largely incompatible with the
complex legal and financial framework that the swaps
necessitate.
The delivery of conservation funds through the vehicle of
debt-for-nature programs involves difficult and, therefore,
costly negotiations between multiple parties on the terms of
the swaps. In some cases, the transaction costs may have been
partially or totally offset by the multiplier effect of the swaps.
Nevertheless, there is little doubt that LDCs have quietly, but
firmly, imposed limits on the size of the swaps to avoid
inflation. Thus, a meaningful level of funds dedicated to the
conservation and sustainable development cannot be delivered
through the swap mechanism.
The seventy-one million dollars raised through debt-for-
nature programs during the last seven years are a first step in
the direction of recognizing that the North must be involved in
the protection of the resources of the South. The next step is
acknowledging that there are no easy and painless solutions
to this problem. The pied piper of debt-for-nature swaps does
not drown the harsh reality of the costs involved.
... See YOUNG, supra note 110, at 86.
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